Romanian campaign (1916-1917). "Complete confusion." Collapse of the Romanian Front New defeats of Romania

Bulgaria Bulgaria

Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire

Commanders

Erich von Falkenhayn
August von Mackensen
Konrad von Goetzendorf
Nikola Zhekov

Strengths of the parties Audio, photo, video on Wikimedia Commons

Romanian campaign- one of the campaigns of the First World War, which pitted the Romanian and Russian armies against the armies of the Central Powers.

In Western historiography it was considered an episode of the war in the Balkan theater of operations; in Russian (Soviet) - as part of the Eastern Front of the First World War.

Background [ | ]

In the political and military circles of the warring countries, the prevailing opinion was that the entry of small states into the war could significantly change the course of events. Therefore, the Entente tried for a long time to win Romania over to its side. Since the beginning of the World War, the country's government has taken a position of “armed wait-and-see,” although since 1883 Romania has been part of the alliance of the Central Powers; at the same time, it began negotiations with the Entente. Romania, which gained independence in 1877, was in ethnic conflict with Austria-Hungary. Entering the war, she counted on the annexation of Transylvania, Bukovina and Banat - territories of Austria-Hungary, inhabited mainly by ethnic Romanians.

Romanian Army [ | ]

The optimistic attitude of many political and military leaders regarding Romania's entry into the war against the backdrop of the real state of the army of King Ferdinand I was in no way justified. Although its strength reached 650 thousand, this figure hardly reflected its real combat effectiveness. The state of the infrastructure was extremely poor, and a third of the army was forced to serve in the rear in order to ensure at least some supply for the combat units. Thus, Romania was able to send only 23 divisions to the front. At the same time, there was practically no railway network in the country, and the supply system ceased to function several kilometers deep into enemy territory. The weapons and equipment of the Romanian army were outdated, and the level of combat training was low. The army had only 1,300 artillery pieces, of which only half met the requirements of the time. The geographical position further aggravated the strategic situation. Neither the Carpathians in the north-west nor the Danube in the south provided sufficient natural protection against a possible enemy invasion. And the country's richest province, Wallachia, directly bordered Austria-Hungary to the north and Bulgaria to the south and was thus vulnerable to attack by the Central Powers on both sides.

Fighting in 1916[ | ]

Romanian army exercises

Already in August, the Romanian army launched an attack on Hungary, from which the French commander-in-chief Joffre expected to change the course of the war. The 2nd Army under the command of General Grigore Crainiceanu and the 4th Army of General Presan invaded Transylvania and advanced 80 km in places. The advancing 400,000-strong Romanian group had a tenfold numerical superiority over the 1st Austrian Army of Artz von Straussenburg. This advantage, however, was never realized. Supply routes in the occupied territories were extremely poor, which became the main problem of the advancing troops. And although they managed to occupy some important border fortifications, already the first major city on their route, Sibiu, highlighted the weaknesses of the Romanian army. Even with an extremely small Austro-Hungarian garrison located in the city, the Romanians, due to problems with logistics support, did not even try to capture it. Fearing further supply problems and the prospect of German intervention, both Romanian generals suspended all offensive operations. Thus, already at the beginning of September 1916, the Romanian army was stuck almost in its original positions, being on the periphery of the relatively insignificant Hungarian province, waiting for further events and giving the initiative to the armies of the Central Powers.

Austrian and German counter-offensive

Meanwhile, the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army sent a 50,000-strong group under the command of General A. M. Zayonchkovsky to help the Romanians. Zayonchkovsky repeatedly complained to the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters, General Alekseev, that the forces allocated to him were not enough to complete the assigned task. However, Alekseev believed that it was better to surrender most of Romania than to weaken other sections of the front. As for the Western Allies, their assistance throughout the campaign consisted of sending military missions to Romania, consisting of several senior officers.

The inaction of the Romanian army and its allies led to a crushing defeat for Romania. Straussenburg's Austrian 1st Army and Falkenhayn's German 9th Army easily drove the Romanians out of Transylvania, while a combined German-Bulgarian-Austrian force under Mackensen began attacking Bucharest from the south. This strategic offensive was accompanied by diversionary actions by General Toshev's Bulgarian 3rd Army along the Black Sea coast towards Dobruja.

Front after the end of the Romanian campaign

The Romanian command hoped that Russian troops would repel the Bulgarian invasion of Dobruja and launch a counter-offensive, and 15 Romanian divisions under the command of Averescu were allocated to defend Bucharest. However, the Romanian-Russian counter-offensive, which began on September 15, ended in failure. The Bulgarian army proved to be very motivated, fighting in territory inhabited by Bulgarians. Despite the fact that the Romanians managed to cross the Danube and thus enter Bulgaria, the operation was stopped due to an unsuccessful offensive on the Dobruja front. Russian forces were small in number and, with the exception of the Serbian battalion, insufficiently motivated. As a result, the diversionary actions of the Bulgarian troops turned into an unforeseen strategic success. The Russian-Romanian troops were driven back 100 km to the north, and by the end of October the Bulgarians managed to capture Constanta and Cernavode, thus isolating Bucharest from the left flank. At the same time, Austrian troops completely regained Transylvania and were preparing to attack the Romanian capital. On October 23, August von Mackensen dealt the main blow, crossing the Danube. The Romanians, forced to defend on three directions at once, were unable to provide any significant resistance. On November 29, the attack on Bucharest began.

During the defense of the country's capital, the French General Berthelot, directed by Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre, attempted to organize a counterattack from the flank, similar to the one that saved Paris during the Battle of the Marne in 1914. The energetic ally spent the last reserves of the Romanian army, failing to provide any serious resistance to the Central Powers. On December 6, 1916, Mackensen entered Bucharest. The remnants of the Romanian troops retreated to the province of Moldova, losing another eight of the 22 surviving divisions. In the face of disaster, General Alekseev sent reinforcements to thwart Mackensen's advance into southwestern Russia.

Fighting in 1917[ | ]

Russian troops who came to the aid of the Romanian army stopped the Austro-German troops on the river in December 1916 - January 1917. Siret. The Bulgarian armies remained in the south closer to their homeland and to the former Romanian territories inhabited by Bulgarians who moved to Romania in 1913. Romania's entry into the war did not improve the situation for the Entente. The Romanian Front of the Russian Army was created, which included the Danube Army, the 6th Army from Petrograd, the 4th Army from the Western Front and the 9th Army from the Southwestern Front, as well as the remnants of the Romanian troops. Having lost almost all of its territory and 250 thousand people in the fighting of 1916. killed, wounded and captured, Romania practically dropped out of the war.

To raise the morale of the soldiers, mostly former peasants, legislative activity was resumed after the completion of agrarian and electoral reforms. Parliament adopted the corresponding constitutional amendments, and King Ferdinand I personally promised the peasant soldiers land and the right to vote after the end of the war. And by the summer of 1917, the Romanian army was already much better trained and equipped than in 1916, to which was added the determination of the troops not to miss the “last chance” to preserve Romanian statehood. Active hostilities were resumed in July as part of the June Offensive planned by the Russian Provisional Government. In the Battle of Marasti (began on July 22), the Romanian army under the command of General A. Averescu managed to liberate about 500 km² of territory. The retaliatory counter-offensive of Austro-German troops under the command of Mackensen was stopped at the Battle of Măreşesti. It is believed that the heroism of the Romanian soldiers shown there actually saved Romania from withdrawal from the war, especially since the Russian units in these military operations were rather passive due to the increasing decomposition of the Russian army. By September 8, the front had finally stabilized, and these were the last active hostilities on the Eastern Front in 1917.

Consequences [ | ]

Notes [ | ]

Comments [ | ]

Literature [ | ]


	Military administration bodies Imperial Main Apartment Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Military Ministry of the Russian Empire Fronts Northwestern in August 1915 was divided into Northern and Western Southwestern Romanian Caucasian incl. Persian Army 11 (Blockade) Danube Caucasian Special (from 08.1916) Corps 1st Guards 2nd Guards Grenadier Gendarmerie Expeditionary Courier Army:

Bulgaria Bulgaria

Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire

Commanders

Strengths of the parties Media files on Wikimedia Commons

Romanian campaign- one of the campaigns of the First World War, which pitted the Romanian and Russian armies against the armies of the Central Powers.

In Western historiography it was considered an episode of the war in the Balkan theater of operations; in Russian (Soviet) - as part of the Eastern Front of the First World War.

Background

Romanian Army

Fighting in 1916

Romanian army exercises

Austrian and German counter-offensive

Front after the end of the Romanian campaign

Fighting in 1917

Consequences

Notes

Comments

Literature

Liddell Garth B. 1914. The truth about the First World War. - M.: Eksmo, 2009. - 480 s. - (A turning point in history). - 4300 copies. - ISBN 978-5-699-36036-9.
John Keegan: Der Erste Weltkrieg - Eine europäische Tragödie. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuchverlag 2001. ISBN 3-499-61194-5
Manfried Rauchensteiner: Der Tod des Doppeladlers: Österreich-Ungarn und der Erste Weltkrieg. Graz, Wien, Köln: Styria 1993. - ISBN 3-222-12116-8
Norman Stone: The Eastern Front 1914-1917. London: Hodder and Stoughton 1985. ISBN 0-340-36035-6
Christian Zentner: Der Erste Weltkrieg. Rastatt: Moewig-Verlag 2000. ISBN 3-8118-1652-7
Ioan-Aurel Pop, Ioan Bolovan:"Istoria României." Cluj-Napoca: Institutul Cultural Român 2004 ISBN 5-7777-0260-0


	Military administration bodies Imperial Main Apartment Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Military Ministry of the Russian Empire Fronts Northwestern in August 1915 was divided into Northern and Western Southwestern Romanian Caucasian incl. Persian Army 11 (Blockade) Dobrudzhansky Danube Caucasian Special (from 08.1916) Corps 1st Guards 2nd Guards Grenadier Gendarmerie Expeditionary Courier Army:

For the first two years of the World War, Romania adhered to neutrality, waiting for the most opportune moment to go over to the side of one or another coalition. All this, however, did not prevent her from supplying England with wheat, supplying Russia with old rifles, allowing disguised German soldiers and officers into Turkey, selling butter and meat to Germany, and sending welcoming telegrams to Emperor Wilhelm.

The Allied landings at Thessaloniki, the capture of Erzurum and the victories of the Russian Southwestern Front put an end to Romania's hesitation, and on August 14, 1916, it declared war on Austria-Hungary.

The Russian command did not believe in real assistance to the front from the Romanian army and advised it to direct its forces against the Bulgarians.

However, the Romanians, trying to quickly realize their idea of national unification, rushed to Transylvania. As a result of four months of fighting, the Romanian troops were defeated and a significant part of the country fell into the hands of the Germans.

To prevent the complete collapse of the Romanian army, which had only 70 thousand soldiers left, and to stop the German offensive aimed at southern Russia, the command of the Southwestern Front had to carry out an auxiliary operation. It demanded the extension of the front of the Russian armies by 500 kilometers and the transfer of 35 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions here.

Russian troops took up positions along the Danube and Seret rivers, as well as in the Carpathians. The only combat-ready 2nd Romanian Army wedged itself between the 4th and 9th Russian armies. Other units of the Romanian army were reorganized, their new formation began to be carried out by the French and Russian artillery instructors. About 15 Romanian divisions were created.

On November 10, 1916, Major General Mannerheim received a secret telegram from the front commander with an order to immediately march on horseback to the Romanian theater of operations, transferring his positions to the infantry division.

The transfer of positions and preparations for the long, almost 20-day journey took about five days. On the eve of departure, a telegram from army headquarters arrived - to hand over all the division's military operations logs. The officers of the headquarters and regiments worked day and night, remembering endless battles, advances and retreats, majestic summer nights in Volyn, painful forest roads, smelly and dirty camps.

And then came the last day of the division’s stay in Pochaev. At a short flight, the chief of staff of the division, Lieutenant Colonel Georgievich, spoke about the route of the regiments along the route Kremenets - Ternopil - Volochisk - Kamenets-Podolsky - Brichany - Balti - Iasi - Roman - Bakeu - Adjud - Odobesti. The places of parking and overnight stays were named, and the organization of meals was reported. Officers who spoke French were assigned the functions of translators when the division entered Romanian territory. Bishop Dionysius of Kremenets served a short prayer service before the campaign.

Finally, the division set off under heavy, not at all autumn rain, along dirty and broken roads past bare fields and small villages...

The first large camp in the city of Kamenets-Podolsky, where the regiments entered late at night. Officers of the military commandant's office and quartermasters quickly placed soldiers and officers in houses and apartments. Dinner was organized. Mannerheim and the brigade commanders rented rooms in a fairly decent hotel near the central square of the city. It was almost impossible to sleep; I had to look at the reports of the regiment commanders about the lost things. Mannerheim was outraged by the blatant lies of the commander of the Starodub dragoons, whose number of missing greatcoats was one and a half times greater than the number of killed and wounded soldiers.

Gustav, brought up in the spirit of economy and frugality, when the rule “keep a watchful eye on every mark, spend it carefully, with constant vigilance” is strictly observed, was always surprised that the Russian army had no idea about economic discipline, sifting, as if through a sieve, endless material resources. Be that as it may, the incident with the overcoats greatly spoiled the general’s mood.

However, in the morning, having pampered the faithful and reliable Desi with sugar, who greeted the general with a quiet neigh, and easily, quite youthfully, flew into the saddle, Mannerheim felt a surge of strength and vigor. Recalling this transition, one of the officers of the Akhtyrsky regiment said: “In any difficult moments of our movement to the Romanian border, General Mannerheim was a secular, always restrained, resourceful and self-confident officer, with an attentive gaze of cold eyes.”

The division's regiments quickly passed Brichani, stopping only for three hours to feed the people and horses. After a one-day rest in Balti, the division reached the Russian-Romanian border.

Five hours later, the leading regiment of the division entered the city of Iasi, crowded with refugees and rear army institutions. The trotting riders passed the main street, passing the mansion where the Romanian king lived, at the gate of which stood a guard in uniform resembling cavalry guards. At the place where the division's regiments were temporarily stationed, they were met by enthusiastic crowds of Russians. These were members of the eunuchs sect, who left Russia almost 40 years ago to settle abroad forever. Members of this terrible sect, natives of the Oryol and Novgorod provinces, in which men, after the birth of their first son, castrate themselves, forever depriving their offspring, received the full trust of the Romanians thanks to their honesty and sobriety. Moreover, in Romania they did not promote their teachings. Skoptsy were great lovers of horses. Romanian officers said that after requisitioning horses from the eunuchs, they went to the barracks and explained to the soldiers what the character of their previous horses was and how they should be treated.

Major General Mannerheim and his chief of staff paid a short visit to the Russian commandant of the city, General Kazakevich, a former Preobrazhenite, whom the baron knew from St. Petersburg. Here Mannerheim met with General Krymov, the future unsuccessful commander of the strange campaign against Petrograd on the orders of Kerensky in 1917. Krymov was very happy to learn that his Ussuri division would occupy the front next to Mannerheim’s regiments. The conversation turned to the fatal mistakes of the sovereign and the “bloodless revolution”, of which Krymov was an ardent supporter. The Baron, listening to Krymov’s rantings, skillfully turned the conversation from political to military.

When the leading detachment of the division entered the city of Roman, an excited lieutenant rushed to the equestrian group of headquarters officers with which Mannerheim was riding, reporting to the general that the commander of the 9th Army, General Lechitsky, was waiting for him on the main square of the city near the magistrate's building.

The Baron, together with his adjutant and chief of staff, overtook the regiments at a gallop and was the first to enter the city. Indeed, the army commander stood with the magistrate with officers and a platoon of guards.

Small, dry Lechitsky quickly jumped off his horse and headed towards Mannerheim. The general did the same and, putting his hand to the visor of his cap, began his report. The commander stopped him with a wave of his hand:

No need for conventions, Baron. I am well aware of your brilliant transition, in which you did not lose a single horse. You are a wonderful officer, let me hug and kiss you. I know that there are difficult days ahead for you here in Romania. Her army, according to my information, has already been destroyed by the Germans, but you and I are officers and have no right to discuss the orders of the Supreme Commander. I ordered your soldiers and officers to be well accommodated and fed and, to my regret, to give them here in Roman only one day's rest. Romanians cry out for help every day, we need to help them.

On December 6, the division’s regiments set off on their further journey and the next day at noon they arrived in the village of Odobeshti, which struck Mannerheim with its lopsided houses and dusty streets along which oxen roamed gloomily. When all the regiments of the division, artillery, sappers, signalmen and convoys were drawn into the village, they were lined up in a wide corn field. General Mannerheim and Colonel Georgievich with a group of Romanian officers who met the division drove along the line of regiments. Then the general addressed them with a welcoming speech. He thanked the soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers for the successful multi-kilometer journey they made, comparing them to Suvorov's eagles. At the end of his speech, Mannerheim noted that he believed that the division would again cover itself with glory in the battles for the liberation of fraternal Romania from the insidious enemy. He quickly translated the Romanian colonel's short greeting from French into Russian.

Having entrusted the chief of staff and brigade commanders, together with the Romanian quarterers, with the placement of soldiers and officers, the general set off for the city of Focsani in the car that was sent for him. We drove slowly along a terrible highway, broken by the constant movement of convoys and muddy roads. The entire area on either side was covered with crowds of refugees and convoys heading north. About an hour and a half later we entered Focsani - the center of Putna County. The city was surrounded by gardens. Small two-story houses with wide balconies were hidden among the bare branches. There were many Romanian soldiers on the streets, among whom Moldavian peasants stood out as colorful spots.

The headquarters of the 2nd Romanian Army was located in a large, beautiful house, near which stood several cars and some strange carriage drawn by six horses. A mustachioed soldier was sleeping on the box.

The army commander, General Averesko, met Mannerheim at the entrance. He was a tall, dark, elegant officer with a blue-black mustache and the same black, cunning eyes.

Averesko invited Mannerheim into his office, which was simply cluttered with antique carved furniture. And paintings with half-naked Parisian divas were completely out of place here. The table was quickly set with an abundance of fruit and expensive vintage wines. The commander began the conversation in excellent French, which in Romania was “the language of the top 10,000.” We talked about the long march of the division, remembered St. Petersburg, where Averesko studied, and even found mutual acquaintances.

“My general,” the commander turned to Mannerheim, “place your regiments in Odobeshti and relax, breathe our beautiful mountain air.” I have already given the necessary orders. Everything will be great, I swear on my honor.

However, the rest was short. Two days later, an officer on special assignments from the commander of the Romanian army arrived at Mannerheim. Bowing, he said:

My general, the commander, apologizes to you for interrupting your rest, and sends you the following order: “Immediately move to the area of the village of Coza and accept there the 7th Romanian brigade of Colonel Prince Sturdza into your division. In agreement with generals Lechitsky and Shcherbachev, your formation received the code name “Vrancea.” In addition, my general, the commander, gives you our operational maps and asks you to get acquainted with them. I have been instructed to give you a brief description of your combat area. Here, look at the map, my general. We are now in the most accessible part of the Transylvanian Alps, since their main ridge here decreases and acquires a purely alpine character, forming mountain-forested strips 25–35 kilometers wide. You see, there are many good roads here, with mountains and passes accessible. In the valley of the Putna River there are large oak and maple groves, and on the sunny slopes there are vineyards. True, there are many large hills with very steep slopes. Look, there are two large rivers here - the Seret, which begins in the Bukovinian Carpathians, and the Putna with its tributary Milkovo. In its lower course, from the village of Bakeu, the Seret River became a serious obstacle for our common enemy. Here and there are the positions of your Russian and our Romanian troops.

General Mannerheim, thanking the Romanian major for the detailed information, called Colonel Shumov and ordered him to march with two squadrons of lancers to the area of the village of Koza and establish contact with the 7th Romanian brigade.

Having studied the Romanian operational maps in detail, the baron ordered General Zhukov with the Akhtyrka hussars and four guns of the Don Battery to occupy the village of Gurastrada. Colonel Smirnov with two hundred Orenburg Cossacks occupy the village of Paltinul and establish contact with the 3rd Romanian division. The remaining units of the division were placed in reserve in the area of the village of Poyana-Neruzha. The division headquarters was located in the village of Vidra.

In the evening, the commander of the 7th Romanian Brigade, the richest landowner in Romania, Colonel Prince Sturdza, arrived at Mannerheim’s headquarters with a large convoy. Military operations took place in the area where he owned seven thousand hectares of fertile land, with thousands of farm laborers. His luxurious mansion in Iasi could only compete with the building of the Russian mission and was incomparable with the modest home of the King of Romania.

In front of Mannerheim stood a man of average height, well-built, dark, with a large, well-groomed mustache and a beautiful head of hair. The colonel was accompanied by three officers who literally looked into his mouth, ready to fulfill his every whim.

Demonstrating an excellent knowledge of the French language, the prince began the conversation with the remark:

My general, why are you accommodated in such a bad house? Not far from here, just eight kilometers away, are my two hunting lodges. There, general, you will be like in a fairy tale. And what kind of maids I have! Captain Handriu, go immediately and prepare everything to receive guests.

“My colonel,” Mannerheim replied, “thank you for your concern, but I and my soldiers did not come here to relax in your beautiful places.” Your situation and mine are quite serious, and we have no time for hunting lodges. Please come to the map. Let's think about our actions together. You see, on this 55-kilometer front, next to your brigade, I placed the regiments of my division. On the left flank we have the first Nerchinsk Cossack regiment of the Heir to the Tsarevich. I am looking forward to meeting with its commander, Colonel Baron Peter Wrangel.

Yesterday, Colonel, my lancers felt your “news” on their own skin. With your retreat, you ruined all the decisions of my headquarters, leaving such important positions for both of us to the enemy. Now we are deprived of good cavalry attacks, we will have to crawl through your mountains. You, Colonel, forced me to urgently attack the enemy near the villages of Koza and Gerastrau.

My general, the main forces of my brigade have now taken positions on the Makredeu mountain range, where my two artillery batteries are located.

On December 13, to stabilize the front line, General Mannerheim ordered the Orenburg Cossacks of Colonel Ivan Smirnov to occupy the village of Nereyul, sending one hundred to the height of 1372. The general ordered the Romanian rifle regiment, which was additionally included in the Vrancea group, to advance to the village of Barzesti. The Starodub dragoons were placed in the “hot reserve”.

Lieutenant Colonel Georgievich conveyed an urgent telegram from the commander of the 2nd Romanian Army, reading: “To General Mannerheim. I order you to occupy Putno station by any means necessary. If you need my support, please let me know immediately. Averesko."

Having gathered the brigade commanders and discussed the difficult situation of the 12th Cavalry Division in which the Romanians had placed it, Mannerheim decided to create a military group, proposing to lead it to Colonel Alexander Bagaldin. The group included two squadrons each from dragoons and lancers, three Romanian infantry battalions, reinforced by two scooter companies and six guns.

On the evening of December 13, a military group attacked the Putno railway station from three sides. The enemy met the attackers with hurricane fire. The frantic chatter of rifles with the imperious accompaniment of machine guns echoed in the mountains with a menacing thunderous echo. In a sparse chain, losing killed and wounded, lancers, dragoons and infantrymen relentlessly approached the German positions.

Shooting and speeding up, the chains began to close. The soldiers run panting - it’s hot, some throw their greatcoats off their shoulders. The enemy is already close. The bayonets came into play. In a timid crowd, throwing down their weapons, the Germans began to gradually leave their trenches. Putno station and a small village near it are in Russian hands. The prisoners are taken away under escort. Everyone was saddened by the sad news: during the attack, an unprecedentedly brave officer, Colonel Bagaldin, whom Mannerheim valued very much, was killed by a stray bullet. Colonel Nikolai Shumov took command of Bagaldin's military group. In the joy of victory, he forgot to order the unit commanders to re-equip the German positions, reorienting them towards the enemy.

The next day at dawn, when the victors were resting peacefully, having emptied several barrels of captured wine and forgetting about the guards, the Germans, quietly approaching from the south, attacked the station.

Suffering heavy losses, the Russians and Romanians hastily retreated in complete disorder.

Having learned about this, Mannerheim, an extremely restrained and correct person, could not stand it and, in the heat of anger, “surrounded” Shumov with all the Russian curses known to him, ordering, under pain of the officer’s court of honor, to immediately liberate the Putno station from the enemy. The general additionally included a squadron of Belgorod lancers and two battalions of Romanians in Shumov’s group, ordering Colonel Sturdz’s brigade to cover the Russian flanks.

During the attack on the Putno station, when the enemy began to retreat, the 7th Romanian brigade, for an unknown reason, began to retreat, exposing the flanks of Shumov’s military group.

Seeing that the Russians and Romanians were about to be surrounded by the enemy, General Mannerheim ordered them to retreat to reserve positions in the mountains, northwest of the village of Koza.

Communication with the regiments of Prince Sturdz was severed, as he unexpectedly moved towards the village of Sovezha.

Having assessed the situation and his combat capabilities, Mannerheim decided that on the right flank of the Vrancea group only Colonel Alexey Odintsev could stop the German offensive.

A new military group is urgently formed, including a brigade of the 12th Cavalry Division, four Romanian regiments and four guns. An attempt to establish contact with Prince Sturdza’s brigade again failed.

Before Colonel Odintsev’s units had time to occupy established positions, a message was received that the first Nerchinsk Cossack regiment of the Ussuri Cavalry Division was moving to the rear, exposing the left flank of the Vrancea group.

The general immediately contacted the commander of the Ussuri division, General Krymov, by telephone and asked him for a meeting. Krymov avoided the meeting, sending Colonel Wrangel in his place.

“Heron,” as Gustav jokingly called the baron, could not say anything concrete, and in general it was not clear why he came.

The further fate of this man is interesting. After Krymov left for a new position - corps commander - Wrangel became commander of the Ussuri Cavalry Division, then the 7th Division. Since August 1918, the baron served in the Volunteer Army in various command positions, and in April 1920 he was Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. In exile, Wrangel founded and headed the Russian Combined Arms Union. He died in 1928 in Brussels and was buried in Belgrade.

The withdrawal from the positions of the Ussuri division forced Mannerheim to transfer the Orenburg Cossacks to this area, who were later replaced by the brigade of Prince Sturdza.

In the afternoon of December 16, the Germans began a persistent offensive against the front of units of the 12th Cavalry Division. The village of Gara-Tulchin changed hands many times, but the Russians steadfastly held their mountain positions. The division's right-flank neighbors, the regiments of Prince Sturdza, maintained their position. For several days now, Mannerheim’s headquarters had been located in shacks crudely “glued together” from rough stones, without stoves. Here we had to try a local brew made from corn flour with garlic and onions, which looks like black dough.

On the morning of December 17, the Germans, having broken through the front of the Romanian units on the Negrelesti River, entered the rear of the military group of Colonel Odintsev, who, despite the help of the lancers, had to retreat. By some miracle, Sturdza's brigade retained its positions and even captured a company of Germans.

On December 18, the front of the international group “Vrancea” stabilized. At 16:00 the Caucasian Native Division approached the positions of the 12th Cavalry Division. The division commander, Prince Dmitry Bagration, announced that his regiments were coming under the command of Mannerheim, who, quickly assessing the situation, handed over all the Romanian units subordinate to him to Colonel Prince Sturdze.

In the evening, for the first time in two weeks, a large mail arrived from the city of Iasi. Opening the Stock Exchange Gazette, Mannerheim was surprised to read the following message, surrounded by a black frame:

“THE DEATH OF GRIGORY RASPUTIN

Today at six in the morning, in one of the aristocratic mansions of the capital, after a reception, Grigory Rasputin-Novykh suddenly passed away.”

The newspaper did not provide any further information on this topic.

Mannerheim met Rasputin several times in St. Petersburg at palace receptions, but was not personally introduced to him. In conversations with friends and ladies-in-waiting of the Empress, especially Vyrubova, he heard many, often opposing, opinions about the “elder”. The rumor of Rasputin's death quickly spread throughout all regiments. Officers discussed this death in different ways, seeing it as the key to big changes in Russian politics. The soldiers' comments were interesting. They said: “The Tsar received Yegory (St. George’s Cross), but the Tsarina lost her Gregory. Now it will become easier for us, maybe the war will end, because Grishka will no longer stir up trouble in Russia.”

During December 19, the position of the Vrancea group remained unchanged. The 7th Romanian brigade with the units attached to it occupied a position on the southern bank of the Valeya Susica River up to the heights near the town of Sovezha. Next were the positions of the Caucasian Native Division to the village of Topeshti. Next to them were the regiments of the 12th Cavalry Division up to the village of Outer. There were two infantry regiments and one squadron of lancers in reserve.

At about eight o'clock in the evening on December 20, the Germans, with an unexpected attack, knocked out the right-flank units of the Romanians from their positions.

Anticipating the possibility of a breakthrough of the front of his units, General Mannerheim put forward his reserve to help the Romanians, which made it possible to restore the situation to some extent.

The next day, at noon, the enemy attacked the center of the Vrancea group - the Caucasian Native Division, but was repulsed.

Having regrouped their units, the Germans began to attack the left flank of the Vrancea group in order to bypass it. This blow was taken by the units of General Zhukov, to whose support the baron sent two hundred Orenburg Cossacks.

On the night of December 20-21, the situation on the Russian front line unexpectedly changed dramatically. All regiments of General Krymov’s Ussuri Division went to the rear, exposing the front line between General Zhukov’s units and the 3rd Romanian Corps. A section of the front in the area of the mountain range with peak 1001, which dominated the entire area, was open to the enemy.

This “Crimov maneuver” put the Vrancea group in a difficult situation. If the Germans had taken the positions of the regiments of the Ussuri Division, then the escape route would have been cut off for the Vrancea group, and the enemy would have calmly reached the rear of the 3rd Romanian Corps and the entire 4th Russian Army.

Mannerheim reported this arbitrariness of General Krymov to the front commander, but did not receive an intelligible answer other than “act according to the situation.” Emigrant and partly Soviet military historians interpret this act of Krymov differently. Some refer to his words: “... I lost all confidence in my Romanian neighbors and moved away, considering myself the right not to subject my units to be cut off.” True, for some reason he forgot that besides the Romanians he had other neighbors - Mannerheim's regiments. Others explain Krymov’s behavior by the order of the front commander, which Mannerheim did not receive, to concentrate a large mass of cavalry in the Galati area under the general command of General Count Keller. This formation was supposed to be thrown behind the Germans.

Major General Mannerheim, as his friends recalled, never violated military ethics and its observance in relations with neighboring units and comrades in service. Unfortunately, this cannot be said about many Russian generals.

Conducting stubborn bloody battles with the Germans on a multi-kilometer front, the Vrancea group did not have free reserve units that could fill the gap left by Krymov’s regiments. Having calculated his capabilities, the baron sends three cavalry patrols (60 people) here, ordering them to imitate Russian units.

On the evening of December 21, the enemy launched an attack on the town of Sovezha - the center of the front of the Vrancea group - and began a massive artillery shelling of the positions of the 7th Romanian brigade and the units attached to it. Unable to withstand the enemy's attack, the Romanians retreated, leaving the village of Barzesti.

The next day, three regiments of the 1st Romanian division and a regiment of Romanian volunteers came to the town of Vidru to help Mannerheim’s units. All of them were sent to the area where the front broke.

Under the pressure of significant enemy forces, supported by powerful artillery and machine-gun fire, the front line of the Vrancea group was broken. The regiments of the 12th Cavalry Division began to retreat along the Putna River valley. The patrols that filled the gap in the front line also had to retreat, since the Romanian units that were supposed to replace them arrived at this sector very late.

The 3rd and 13th Romanian divisions began to retreat under enemy pressure, despite the order of the corps commander to restore their position. With their retreat, the Romanians put the Ufa-Samara Cossack regiment under enemy attack. Given the current situation, General Mannerheim sends his last reserve to help the Cossacks - a Romanian regiment and one squadron of Akhtyr hussars. As a result, the Vrancea group was left without reserves and without contact with the 3rd Romanian Corps.

The Germans, supported by heavy artillery, launched an attack on the front of the Vrancea group from three sides. Unable to withstand the enemy's onslaught, the 12th Cavalry and Native Divisions began to retreat. Mannerheim orders the restoration of the position of his units. But only the 12th Cavalry Division manages to accomplish this, and then only with heavy losses.

The next two days turned into a “stream” retreat of all Romanian units. As a result of this, the 12th Cavalry Division had to pull back its left flank by three kilometers, while the right flank itself, without orders, began to retreat to the east.

By nightfall, fearing a possible catastrophe on his left flank, General Mannerheim orders all units of the Vrancea group, without losing contact with the 15th Romanian division, to withdraw north, closer to units of the 7th Romanian brigade, in order to prevent the retreat of the entire 4th brigade. th army.

By the evening, when the fighting near the mountain range had subsided a little, the headquarters officers, knowing that on this day, like all Western Christians, their commander was celebrating the Nativity of Christ, prepared a modest Christmas table with a bottle of French champagne and a small gift - a set of German captured lighters.

Upon learning of the loss of the main mountain range with an altitude of 1001, the commander of the 2nd Romanian Army ordered all units subordinate to him to attack it. Stubborn fighting began.

On the afternoon of December 26, when the 12th Cavalry Division was replaced by units of the Third Romanian Corps, Mannerheim immediately transferred them to his reserve.

The rest of the Vrancea group was ordered to defend the front from the village of Racoaza to Serbesti. On the same day, in the rear of the Vrancea group, three divisions of the 3rd Cavalry Corps of General Count Keller completed their concentration.

In the sector defended by the brigade of Colonel Prince Strudza, stubborn battles continued all the time, which gradually engulfed the right flank of the Native Division.

On December 28, General Mannerheim decided to replace units of the Native Division, badly battered in the last, successful battles for it, with units subordinate to Prince Sturdza. However, the prince declared that his regiments were completely exhausted and he could not hold out any longer. Mannerheim ordered the 12th Cavalry Division to relieve the natives, and the acting division commander, General Zhukov, to take overall command of the combat area.

On December 29–31, the position of the Vrancea group did not change; it fought moderate battles. At 16:00 on the last day of the year, Major General Mannerheim transferred the division headquarters, serving as the headquarters of the Vrancea group, to the village of Varnitsa, where a New Year's party was organized, to which nurses were invited for the first time.

At about 11 p.m. we sat down at the tables. Although there was enough wine and food, there was no festive mood in the team of officers. The fatigue accumulated during the war years and the uncertainty that 1917 promised everyone took its toll. General Mannerheim's first toast was very short:

Gentlemen, I pray to God that happiness, health and military success will not leave us in the New Year!

The last was a laconic toast from the division chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Georgievich: “For our Russia, gentlemen!”

The defeat of the Romanian army in Dobruja again led to disagreements between the allies. The French and British still sought to shift the full burden of aid to Romania to the Russians. The French demanded that Russia urgently transfer reinforcements to Romania. The Russian Headquarters initially hoped that by sending a corps under the command of General A.M. Zayonchkovsky it would fulfill its allied duty. Chief of Staff of Headquarters Alekseev generally believed that it was better to surrender most of Romania than to weaken other sectors of the front.

Zayonchkovsky understood this well and said directly: “It seems to me that the 47th Corps and General. Zayonchkovsky is the bone that was thrown to Romania so that it would join the side of the Agreement. They put an end to this bone, it was deleted from the Russian armed forces, and if in the future there is any benefit from it, it will be recorded as an unexpected arrival for Russia.” Having gotten to know his allies better, the Russian general became even more depressed: “The impression in military terms is disgusting: this is a complete misunderstanding of modern warfare, terrible panic, the most terrible gossip of a threatening nature in official reports, always refuted by my aerial reconnaissance.”

Under pressure from the allies, the Russian Headquarters was forced to strengthen the expeditionary forces in Romania, and then, when the Romanian army was completely defeated, a new Russian front had to be created. Therefore, first, significant Russian forces were additionally transferred to Romania to help the 47th Corps: two infantry divisions, and then the 4th Siberian Corps and one division from the Caucasian Front. The defeated 3rd Romanian Army was subordinated to Zayonchkovsky. The defeat at Turtukai forced the Romanian government to transfer operational and tactical command of the front in Dobruja to the Russian general Zayonchkovsky. The front in this area was stabilized.

Commander of the Russian Expeditionary Forces in Romania, General Andrei Medardovich Zayonchkovsky

It is also worth remembering that the Russians supported Romania by continuing the offensive against Austria-Hungary. On September 5-11, Russian troops continued offensive operations in the area of the city of Galich. After a series of attacks, they managed to cross to the other side of the Narayuvka River (a tributary of the Rotten Lipa River) and break through the Austrian defenses. This allowed the Russians to bring up heavy artillery and begin shelling Galich. This forced the German command to send all the troops that were intended to attack Romania to Galich. Thanks to this, the Romanian troops were able to remain in Transylvania for another month without being beaten.

At the same time, Lechitsky’s 9th Army fought heroic battles in the Wooded Carpathians. Russian miracle heroes fought without roads in the mountains, in deep snow. The battles at Dorn-Vatra, Jacoben and Kirlibaba are considered one of the most difficult of the entire war. Unfortunately, this feat of the Russian army was not reflected in cinema. Yes, and in general, the First World War is poorly covered in modern Russia. There are practically no large battle paintings that our soldiers deserve.

The Russian Headquarters transferred control of the 8th Army to the Carpathians. After the situation in Romania deteriorated further, and the Romanian command began to transfer troops from the Moldavian Carpathians (Northern Army) to the threatened Wallachia, their place was taken by the troops of our 9th Army, which extended its left flank more and more to the south. Excessive extension of the front (up to 300 versts by mid-September), heavy losses in fierce battles, poor communications in wild mountainous areas, which forced more than usual people to be allocated for messages, for evacuation teams, for bringing ammunition along snow-filled paths, all this made it difficult for the army to operate Lechitsky, who fought with two Austro-Hungarian armies.

General Lechitsky proposed to attack in the more advantageous Transylvanian direction, which would lead our troops through the Maros Valley, bypassing the enemy’s position, and proposed to attack Chik-Sereda. But Headquarters considered the Transylvanian direction “dangerous”, did not want to plunge headlong into Romania, and ordered an attack on Dorna-Vatra and Kirlibaba, where the enemy had already gained a foothold. The October heroic onslaught of our 9th Army pinned the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army with numerous German reinforcements and half of the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army to the Moldavian Carpathians. This delayed the fall of Bucharest for a whole month. The price for this is the mountains near Kirlibaba, drenched in Russian blood.

At the end of October, when Falkenhayn's German army, having received large reinforcements from the French front, dealt a decisive blow to Romania, the Russian 9th Army, straining its last strength, again went on the offensive along the entire front on November 15. The right flank of the army attacked Dorna-Vatra, the left flank tried to break through to Chik-Sereda. Unfortunately, again our command missed time. In August, when the Austro-Hungarian army was still recovering from a crushing defeat and did not have serious forces in the Transylvanian direction, it was possible to develop a decisive offensive. In November, the Austro-Hungarians received strong and large reinforcements and fortified themselves in excellent mountain positions, which, thanks to their natural position and engineering skill, snow and frost, became impregnable. Throughout November there was a fierce battle at Kirlibaba. Russian soldiers in this battle showed unparalleled heroism, fighting against the enemy and nature, suffered huge losses, but were unable to break through. This battle ended the 1916 campaign on the Russian Front (not counting Romania).

Austrian artillery in Transylvania

New defeats for Romania

Meanwhile, in September, control of the 9th German Army appeared on the Romanian front, led by Falkenhayn and 8.5 divisions (6.5 infantry and 2 cavalry), which were removed mainly from the French front. At the same time, the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army under the command of Arthur Artz von Straussenburg was strengthened to 6 divisions, it was reinforced by the Germans. In addition, 3 cavalry divisions were added to its composition.

After the fall of Turtucai, Romanian troops suspended the already sluggish movement in Transylvania and began transferring troops to the south. The goal of the strike by the Bulgarian-German troops under the general command of August von Mackensen was achieved. Although at the beginning of this operation the Bulgarians and Germans did not have enough forces to occupy Dobruja if the Romanians had skillfully resisted. A third of the troops from the 2nd Army in Transylvania were immediately taken into the strategic reserve. The ex-commander of the 2nd Army, Averescu, was transferred to the 3rd Army. Averescu had a difficult impression of the troops of the 3rd Army. The units were diluted by more than half with reservists and had poor combat effectiveness.

At the beginning of October, Averescu tried to organize an offensive operation and cross the Danube (the so-called “landing near Ryahovo”), but the offensive attempt ended in complete failure. The hastily erected pontoon bridge was destroyed by the artillery of the Austrian Danube flotilla, and the Romanian soldiers who managed to cross ended up in a “cauldron.” The Romanians lost about 3 thousand people in killed alone. “What goals the Romanian command pursued with this performance remained unclear,” wrote Deputy Chief of the German General Staff von Ludendorff in those days. This failure also affected the Russian troops, who had previously had some successes in the counteroffensive in Dobruja.

General Alexandru Averescu. After Romania entered the First World War in 1916, he commanded the 2nd Army in the southern Carpathians. From September he commanded the 3rd Army, and then the Southern Army Group (3rd and Dobrudzha armies, as well as 4 divisions transferred from the 1st and 2nd armies)

Thus, the very first setbacks paralyzed the Romanian command. Strategic initiative was lost in both the north and south. The entire strategic offensive plan collapsed. Romanian troops passively waited for the enemy to begin his offensive. “Romania,” noted Hindenburg, “was haunted by an evil fate; her army did not move, her leaders did not understand anything, and we managed to gather sufficient forces in Transylvania in time...” While the Romanians were inactive, the German and Austrian command formed the new 9th German Army and strengthened the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army, which was now able to conduct active combat operations.

On September 22, German-Austrian troops under the command of ex-chief of the German General Staff Falkenhayn launched a counteroffensive in Transylvania, previously occupied by Romanian troops. By the end of September, Falkenhayn had driven the Romanian 2nd Army over the border, liberating all of Hungarian Transylvania. The Germans and Austrians created an advantage in the attacked areas and cleverly pushed back the Romanian army. However, they failed to cut off the Romanians from the mountain passes and destroy them. At the same time, von Artz's 1st Austro-Hungarian Army stopped the advance of the Northern Romanian Army (4th Army).

British Secretary of War D. Lloyd George noted: “We knew that the Romanian army had absolutely no heavy artillery, that even the presence of field guns was completely inadequate to meet the requirements of a serious offensive or defense. ... Once the Germans decided to withdraw their troops from the front at Verdun [in France] and send several reserve divisions to Romania, the Romanian guns and equipment were not enough to withstand such a concentrated attack."

The French ambassador to Russia, Maurice Paleologue, wrote in his diary on September 23: “The Hindenburg plan is being carried out along the entire line of the Romanian front. In Dobruja and along the Danube, in the Orsova district and in the gorges of the Carpathians, German, Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish forces exert a closing and continuous pressure, under which the Romanians always retreat.”

However, after the first blow, there was some calm in Transylvania. Falkenhayn accumulated forces for a decisive blow, which was delivered at the end of October. Russian troops (9th Army) fought with the Austro-German troops, diverting the arriving enemy reinforcements to themselves. In addition, the Romanians occupied strong mountain positions here, received reinforcements from the south and actively fought back and even counterattacked from Orsova to Bukovina. Thus, the Alpine corps of General Kraft von Delmensingen, reinforced by two Austrian mountain brigades, was unable to break through the Red Tower pass. The Romanians stubbornly fought back, counterattacked and suffered heavy losses. One of the participants in the battle, a German, described the battle this way: “Machine-gun fire sowed death by the thousands in their (i.e., Romanian) columns; and they gathered and attacked again, boldly, bravely.” The German troops of the 9th Army were also stuck at the Vulcan and Predeal passes. Only by bringing up troops and completing thorough preparations, the Austro-German troops were able to break the resistance of the Romanian troops.

Meanwhile, the Romanian command was now withdrawing troops from the south and moving them to the north. This led to the fact that by the end of September the balance of forces on the Danube and in Dobruja leaned towards the side of the Bulgarian-German troops. Only in Dobruja, battered by previous failures, the Russian-Romanian troops were weakened by sending 20 Romanian, 12 Russian battalions and 24 squadrons of Russian cavalry (about 35 thousand people in total) to the north. Mackensen exposed the Macedonian direction and concentrated 14 divisions in Dobruja against 4 Russians and 4 Romanians. During three days of stubborn fighting, the front was broken through.

As a result, the enemy broke through the front of General Zayonchkovsky’s group at Kobadin and cut the Chernovodsk railway. On October 9 (22), Constanta fell, a strategically important port on the Black Sea with large oil reserves. The next day, the Danube port of Chernovody was occupied by the enemy. Russian-Romanian troops were thrown back 100 km north to Tulcea and Babadag. Dobruja was lost. Alekseev telegraphed Zayonchkovsky: “Please find all parts of your army, take them into your hands, restore control, hold back the enemy’s pressure.” But Zayonchkovsky did not have to solve this problem; he was removed.

Russian Headquarters urgently began to transfer troops to Romania. The new Danube Army was to be led by General Vladimir Sakharov (he had previously commanded the 11th Army). The headquarters instructed the general: “Understand the reigning chaos, take control of the troops, develop a plan for further action, indicate areas for collecting suitable reserves, create engineering preparation for the theater.” At the same time, the troops of the 9th Army in Transnistria and Bukovina were transferred to the control of the 8th Army, which was transferred to the Romanian direction.

Advance of Austro-German troops

Collapse of the Romanian defense

The German command completed the concentration of troops in the Transylvanian direction. The 9th German and 1st Austro-Hungarian armies were, together with the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army of Keves, united in a strike force under the command of the Austrian heir to the throne, Charles, who was destined to play the role of the conqueror of Romania.

On October 29, Falkenhayn dealt a crushing blow to Romania and defeated the 1st Romanian Army in the Jiu River valley. At the same time, von Artz's 1st Austro-Hungarian Army defeated the 2nd Romanian Army at Kronstadt. The retreat of Romanian troops in Transylvania under the pressure of German and Austrian divisions takes on an avalanche-like character. The greatest successes of the Austro-German troops were achieved in the southernmost section of the Carpathians. Developing the offensive, the Germans quickly moved through the Olta valley into the Wallachian plain. On November 8 (21), the Germans captured Craiova; on November 10 (23), the enemy cavalry reached the Olt River and captured the crossing from Caracal to the central regions of the country, almost 100 km from Bucharest. General Kraft made his way through the Red Tower Pass and reached the plain at Rymnik.

In addition, Von Mackensen crossed the Danube from the south from Sistov to Zimnitsa. His new Danube Army, consisting of 5 divisions (1 German, 2 Turkish and 2 Bulgarian), crossed the Danube, occupied Zhurzha and moved to Bucharest. This strategic offensive by Mackensen was accompanied by diversionary actions by General Toshev's 3rd Bulgarian Army along the Black Sea coast towards Dobruja.

Field Marshal August von Mackensen in Sofia

Commander of the German 9th Army Erich von Falkenhayn in Transylvania

In some areas, Romanian troops fought desperately, but this no longer had any significance for the outcome of the campaign. The Romanian troops located in the west of the country, in Oltenia, hastily retreated, trying to get out of the bag, but did not have time, and they folded at the mouth of the Olt River. The German general Ludendorff wrote: “Surrounded on all sides, they [the Romanians] only laid down their arms near the mouth of the Alta at the beginning of December. The hope that the offensive of units of Romanian troops against the Danube army from Bucharest would help them out was not justified.”

Thus, Austrian, German and Bulgarian troops from three sides began an attack on the Romanian capital. It was a disaster. Now the remaining Romanian army was under threat of encirclement in a huge “cauldron” in the Bucharest area. On November 14 (27), the Romanian government and main government institutions were evacuated from Bucharest to Iasi.

The Romanian command hastily gathers all remaining troops on the approaches to Bucharest. Moldova was left to the 9th Army of Lechitsky, which had not yet completed its concentration, and Dobruja to the Danube Army of General Sakharov. The Russian Headquarters also tried to save their ally. In November, the 4th Army Corps approached the Danube Army from the Northern Front, and at the request of the Romanian leadership, it was sent to Wallachia, near Bucharest, instead of Dobruja. The 4th Corps was composed of two divisions - the 2nd and 40th. The 30th Infantry Division was still in Dobruja and did not have time to link up with its corps. Next they planned to send four army corps to Wallachia under the control of Ragosa’s 4th Army. In the future, they planned to send three more corps from the Western and Southwestern fronts to Romania.

Thus, the Russian Headquarters had to pay for the game of giveaway with the allies, for the strategic mistakes of Bucharest and its own short-sightedness. General Alekseev did not want to immediately send a strike group of 5-6 corps to Romania in a timely manner, which could give the Romanian army the necessary offensive impetus. Now, as military historian A. A. Kersnovsky wrote, “not only five, but ten corps were not enough.” Before the beginning of December, Russian troops could not concentrate. The Russian railway network worked poorly and intermittently. The single-track Bessarabian roads were completely unsuited to the emergency transfer of large masses of troops with weapons and supplies. The Romanian roads were in complete disarray, and the military disaster completely ruined them. To transport two corps, 250 trains were needed, which required at least half a month, and the enemy did not stand still. From the Prut line, our troops had to go deep into Wallachia in marching order. As a result, our troops approached the front line completely exhausted and entered the battle in units, which sharply reduced their combat effectiveness.

It is not surprising that the commander of the Russian Southwestern Front, General Alexei Brusilov, described the situation in the Romanian theater in two words - “complete confusion.” The 9th Army and the new Danube Army, sent to help the Romanians, were subordinate to Brusilov. “And between them is the Romanian army, acting independently and undertaking an operation of its own invention...” Brusilov noted that in such conditions he could not control troops.

The Russian Headquarters were extremely irritated by such allies. Bucharest demanded urgent help. On September 25, Prime Minister Bratianu telegraphed: “Our troops have been thrown back to Brasov. The urgency of a powerful Russian intervention in Transylvania is unfortunately more obvious than ever. … 24 hours make a big difference in the present state of affairs.”

Requests for help came one after another. Moreover, they were accompanied by absolutely fantastic numbers of enemy forces. So, on September 26, the Romanian head of government Bratianu, citing Swiss sources (!), that Germany plans to concentrate 500-600 thousand soldiers against Romania. At the end of September, Queen Mary turned to the Russian Tsar: “I am not at all ashamed to address you with this cry for help, I tried to save my country in every possible way...”.

The head of the Russian Headquarters, Alekseev, irritably reassured the allies. “600 thousand people are equal to 60 divisions. Where will the Germans get them from? They will hardly be able to scrape together twenty divisions,” he wrote to the Romanian representative at Headquarters, General Coanda. Indeed, according to German data, by the end of September, 19 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions were operating against Romania, not counting individual units and subunits.

Alekseev telegraphed the Romanian General Iliescu: “In Transylvania and Dobruja, the Germans and their allies have 251 battalions and 70 squadrons; The enemy forces, as you deign to see, are not at all so formidable that they can talk about a critical or extremely difficult situation. We have 331 Romanian, 52 Russian battalions, 383 in total.” In private conversations, Alekseev spoke even more sharply: “The nervousness of the Romanians is incomprehensible to me. Having significant forces at their disposal, they only know how to shout about a critical situation.” Alekseev suggested that the Romanian command hold tightly to the Russian flanks in Moldova and Dobruja, reduce the front line, sacrifice Oltenia and, as a last resort, Bucharest. “The main task is to preserve the army at all costs.”

Representatives of the Entente countries at Russian Headquarters had a similar opinion. The main problem was not that Romanian soldiers were completely unprepared for modern warfare, but that the quality of troop management was completely unsatisfactory. An English agent in Romania reported: “The 1st and 2nd armies should be considered demoralized, but not because the troops were unsuitable, but because the management was bad...”. “The Romanian soldier is good; “He has a good spirit,” noted the French general Janin. “The young officers are very inexperienced, some of the commanders are very timid - these are the reasons for the recent failures... The Romanian commanders are extremely nervous, they have already used up all their reserves.”

At the same time, the French and British were in no hurry to provide real assistance to the Romanians, shifting all responsibility for Romania to the Russians. It was not possible to activate the Thessaloniki Front; everything was limited to local battles. Mostly they fought with the Bulgarians on the Serbian sector of the front. The Serbs were able to recapture previously lost positions. On November 15, the commander of the German forces on the Thessaloniki front, General Otto von Below, decided to abandon the city of Monastery (Monastir), an important transport hub in Macedonia. The Bulgarians were against this decision, but were forced to concede. On November 19, Serbian, French and Russian troops entered the city. For the Serbs, it was the first hometown retaken after the defeat and occupation of the country by the armies of the Central Powers in 1915. But in general, the Allies were unable to solve the problem of defeating the Bulgarian army in order to significantly help Romania. The Bulgarian army retained its combat capability.

The French promised to transfer one and a half divisions to Thessaloniki, but nothing was achieved from the British. At the same time, the French, at the request of Bucharest, sent there a large military mission led by General Berthelot. She was in no hurry; on the way she stopped in Petrograd to again persuade the Russians to send new troops to Bucharest and Dobruja. The Romanians wanted to appoint a French general as chief of their general staff. But he wisely refused such an honor.